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Michigan local governments engage in a wide range of cooperative activities. Little is 
known, however, about what factors motivate local governments to engage in 
intergovernmental cooperation and how local government officials choose among various 
forms of collaboration. We develop and test a theory of intergovernmental cooperation 
that explains differences in the factors that lead local governments to engage in horizontal 
cooperation with other local units versus vertical cooperation with county or state 
governments. Our primary focus is on fiscal capacity: we hypothesize that limited fiscal 
capacity leads many local governments, especially townships, to work collaboratively 
with state or county actors to provide government services. Local governments with 
greater fiscal capacity, especially cities, are stronger potential partners and so are more 
likely to collaborate with other local governments using horizontal arrangements. We 
expect other factors, such as population characteristics, local and regional economic 
factors, federal or state mandates, and the existence of collaborative partners, to matter as 
well. We test these hypotheses with survey data collected in 2005 by the Citizens 
Research Council of Michigan on the mode of service provision employed by 460 
Michigan local governments across 115 service categories. We find strong support for 
our propositions about the linkage between local fiscal capacity and intergovernmental 
cooperation on public services.  
 
Chapter in Metropolitan Affairs in Michigan, Michigan State University Press, 
Forthcoming, 2008.
Explaining Horizontal and Vertical Cooperation on Public Services in Michigan: 
The Role of Local Fiscal Capacity 
 
Michigan’s local governments face an increasingly difficult environment for providing 
high quality municipal services to their residents: they are feeling the effects of a single 
state recession, legislative policies that limit their ability capitalize on their own-source 
revenues, and cost pressures from various sources. Michigan’s weak economy, which has 
reduced state tax revenues, has led to cuts in funding for state revenue sharing programs 
that provide funding for local government operations. At the same time, constitutional 
and statutory policies have created property tax limitations that hamper the ability of 
local governments to benefit from year-to-year growth in the value of property. At the 
same time, the cost of providing local government services is increasing. Health care 
expenses, legacy costs, and the price of some common inputs like motor fuel, continue to 
escalate.  In the face of these pressures, local government officials have three options: (1) 
increase taxes to raise more revenues; (2) reduce spending to alter the menu of services 
provided to their residents; and/or (3) find alternative methods of providing services at 
current levels while reducing costs. 
Interlocal collaboration for the provision of governmental services is one such 
alternative method. Michigan local governments already engage in a wide range of 
cooperative activities. Despite the state’s strong home rule traditions and lack of strong 
mandates or incentives for engaging in collaborative service arrangements, significant 
numbers of local governments currently cooperate with other governments to provide 
such services as firefighting, libraries, water and sewer, emergency dispatch, public 
transit, watershed management, and many others (CRC, 2005).  
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Yet in spite of the frequency of this collaboration, our understanding of the factors 
affecting intergovernmental cooperation remains fairly rudimentary. Previous studies 
have attempted, with only limited success, to develop models illustrating the political, 
economic, and demographic factors affecting levels of interlocal cooperation (LeRoux, 
2006; Krueger, 2005; Post, 2002; Rawlings, 2003; Wood, 2004; Zeemering, 2007). 
Consistent patterns have yet to emerge from this research literature. Likewise, even as 
local government officials have long recognized the role of intergovernmental 
cooperation, it is often clear to them what services are the strongest candidates for 
collaboration and which other governmental units are the best candidates for partnerships.   
We suspect that a key reason for the lack of consensus in past studies, and for a 
lack of clarity among local officials, is that local governments pursue different types of 
cooperation for different reasons. In particular, we propose that a fundamentally different 
calculation underlies the choice between horizontal and vertical cooperation on public 
services for many municipal governments. By horizontal cooperation, we mean joint 
activities involving two or more governmental units at the same level of government. 
Common examples include joint police and fire dispatch and library districts between 
cities, villages, and townships. We view these forms of horizontal cooperation as 
voluntary exchange relationships between two or more local governments in which each 
sees benefits to the cooperation, net of its costs. In contrast, by vertical cooperation, we 
refer to cooperation between units at different levels of government. Vertical cooperation 
includes townships, villages, or cities contracting for services with county or state 
government and joint provision of services between municipal governments and the 
county or state. Common examples include county-local emergency planning, animal 
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control, and environmental initiatives. We view these forms of vertical cooperation as 
dependency relationships in which the costs and benefits of cooperation are highly 
asymmetric to actors at different levels of government.  
This chapter seeks to improve the understanding of intergovernmental 
collaboration by explaining existing patterns of horizontal and vertical cooperation in 
Michigan. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
present our hypotheses about the determinants of several different modes of service 
provision, including horizontal and vertical cooperation, as well as self-provision. We 
focus most directly on the effects of local fiscal capacity in these decisions, as measured 
by a jurisdiction’s total property value and taxing authority. Next, we describe our unique 
dataset and report descriptive statistics about patterns of service delivery arrangements in 
Michigan. We follow with multivariate analyses for each mode of service provision. We 
find that variations in fiscal capacity, both in terms of fiscal powers permitted to the unit 
and the amount of property wealth in the jurisdiction, affect the likelihood of 
intergovernmental cooperation. We conclude by summarizing our findings and discussing 
the policy implications of this work. 
 
Local Fiscal Capacity and Intergovernmental Contracting 
We conceptualize a local government’s decision to cooperate on service provision as 
resulting from a consideration of the relative costs and benefits of four different options: 
(1) self-providing the service; (2) cooperating with one or more peer governments (i.e., 
horizontal cooperation); (3) cooperating with the state or county (i.e., vertical 
cooperation); and (4) not providing the service.1  
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We begin with the assumption that municipal governments are inclined to self-
provide services. Maintaining autonomy over service decisions is highly valued in many 
communities in Michigan and local government policymakers can be expected to prefer 
to construct facilities, purchase equipment, and employ the municipal staff required to 
provide services on their own. Direct provision of services contributes to the 
community’s identity, character, and quality of life, and enables elected officials to 
provide personalized service to residents (Visser, 2004). The attraction of these benefits 
to residents and local government officials in Michigan is strong (Zeemering, 2007). 
However, direct provision of certain services can be prohibitively costly to many local 
governments.   
When direct service provision becomes cost prohibitive, local government 
policymakers consider the relative costs and benefits of other forms of service delivery 
such as using interlocal agreements to cooperate with potential partners. Such 
collaboration permits the separation of provision decisions from production decisions. 
This enables local governments to realize savings when the costs of producing and 
delivering services are distributed among a larger number of governments, while 
retaining some level of autonomy over provision decisions regarding service levels and 
quality.  
Decisions about collaboration are driven by a combination of factors internal and 
external to the local government. In terms of internal factors, we are primarily concerned 
with the effect of local government fiscal capacity. Low fiscal capacity may result from 
several factors: low property values in rural or aging urban settings; a relative lack of 
aggregate property wealth in poor or sparsely populated communities; and constraints on 
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the ability of local units to raise revenues from their tax base arising from limits imposed 
by the state constitution, state laws, or their own charters.  
We propose that fiscal capacity considerations lead local governments to think 
about the opportunities and challenges associated with each mode of service provision in 
different ways. Local governments with extremely low fiscal capacity have difficulty in 
meeting residents’ demands for public services within their budgets and may turn to other 
governments for services they cannot afford to provide alone. Their ability to find 
suitable partners, however, is likely to be quite limited. Two poor or fiscally constrained 
local governments may be no better suited to provide services jointly than they are to 
provide those services individually. From the perspective of other local governments, the 
prospect of cooperating with a poor or fiscally constrained neighbor is likely to be seen 
negatively, since that partner has limited resources to contribute to the cooperative effort 
(Lackey, Freshwater, and Rupasingha 2002). Thus, we hypothesize that local 
governments with lower fiscal capacity are less likely to engage in horizontal 
cooperation. 
County or state governments, by contrast, already provide some of the same 
services as their constituent local governments and may be willing and able to offer 
support to those units. From the state or county’s perspective, a local government unable 
to provide basic services may lead to disinvestment, which ultimately affects not only the 
city or township tax base, but the state and county tax base as well. County or state 
governments may thus be motivated to partner with local governments, regardless of the 
local government’s resource base. Indeed, county and state governments may view their 
poorest or most fiscally constrained local units to be most worthy of support from their 
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limited resources. We therefore hypothesize that local governments with lower fiscal 
capacity are more likely to engage in vertical cooperation. 
For other communities, fiscal necessity will be less desperate, yet they may still 
choose voluntary cooperation when the perceived benefits of cooperation outweigh the 
political costs of ceding authority over service provision. Such cooperation may be 
especially attractive to communities in the mid range of fiscal capacity: they are not so 
fiscally constrained as to view the cost of service provision as prohibitive, but they are 
sufficiently constrained to need to take advantage of opportunities for efficiency in 
service provision. For example, it may make sense for moderately constrained cities to 
jointly undertake substantial capital investments, either because they lack the ability to 
borrow enough funds individually or because they cannot fully exploit the economies of 
scale present in a particular investment by working alone. In these cases, local 
governments may choose to partner with their neighbors, particularly if those neighbors 
face similar circumstances. We note that in these cases of horizontal cooperation, it is not 
the lack of fiscal capacity that brings local governments into collaborative relationships. 
Rather, it is the possibility of leveraging opportunities that are not available or not as 
attractive to local governments operating alone. We therefore hypothesize that local 
governments in the mid range of fiscal capacity are more likely to engage in horizontal 
cooperation.  
The dynamics for communities in the mid range of fiscal capacity are quite 
different with respect to their need for county and state services. We expect that, when 
compared to their poorest counterparts, local governments with moderate fiscal capacity 
will feel less need for assistance from the state or county governments. We therefore 
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hypothesize that local governments in the mid range of fiscal capacity are less likely to 
engage in vertical cooperation. 
Communities with the greatest fiscal capacity, by contrast, may prefer to retain 
authority over the provision of government services and provide them directly. These 
wealthy communities are not driven to cooperation by fiscal necessity. When they do 
choose joint service provision, the decision to cooperate will be more voluntary and 
based on cost containment rather than an inability to provide services individually. We 
therefore hypothesize that local governments with the greatest fiscal capacity are less 
likely to engage in either form of cooperation.  
 
Other Internal and External Factors 
In addition to fiscal capacity, other internal factors are expected to affect local 
governments’ choices of service provision. One set of factors is the jurisdiction’s 
population size and the geographic dispersion of this population within the unit. Populous 
communities may face greater demands for services, as their populations comprise 
numerous interests with diverse service needs (Oakerson 2004). Demands for expanded 
services may be even greater when the population is densely packed or the area covered 
by the government is relatively small, since the close and intense interactions of a dense 
population require greater government intervention to mitigate externalities (Frederickson 
1999; Post 2002). Additional factors, such as the racial/ethnic composition and age 
distribution of the local population may also affect the unit’s service delivery choices. 
Older populations have been found to prefer direct service provision (Morgan and 
Hirlinger 1991) and units with heterogeneous populations are thought to be less attractive 
 7
to potential collaborators because they have more trouble achieving consensus on 
decisions about service levels and quality (Oakerson 2004). Therefore, we hypothesize 
that local governments with large populations and greater proportions of nonwhite and 
older residents are more likely to self-provide services.  
Finally, we expect the number and spatial density of local governments in the 
region to affect opportunities for cooperation. “The geographic density of metropolitan 
area governments influences the ability of residents to live, work, and recreate in multiple 
communities, the likelihood that local officials will have personal as well as professional 
relationships, and the likelihood that policy spillovers will affect multiple communities” 
(Post, 2002: 124). Thus, we hypothesize that greater numbers of potential local 
government partners increase the likelihood of horizontal cooperation. Geographically 
larger local governments are expected to be less likely to engage in horizontal 
cooperation.  
Second, the cost characteristics of each particular service are expected to affect 
the opportunity for and value of cooperation. There is little to be gained from 
collaborating on labor-intensive services such as police patrol. Increasing the geographic 
area, the number of parcels, or the population to be served requires a commensurate 
increase in the staffing needed to provide the service, thereby increasing costs. For other 
services, however, there are economies to be gained through collaboration.  Local 
governments can benefit from economies of scale inherent in capital-intensive services 
such as those requiring new facilities or equipment. Once the capital items are in place, 
the marginal cost to the governmental unit of providing services to an additional resident 
is small, and cooperation may allow participating governments to provide the service at a 
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more efficient scale, allowing them to capture unit-cost savings (LeRoux and Carr 2007; 
Post 2002). We therefore hypothesize that local governments will be less likely to engage 
in horizontal cooperation on labor-intensive services and will be more likely to engage in 
horizontal cooperation on capital-intensive services and activities.  
Local governments also can benefit from economies in services that require 
personnel with high levels of technical skills such as environmental management or 
specialized legal services. These services, which can often be provided without regard to 
geographic connectedness, depend on the service provider employing personnel that have 
obtained specialized academic training or have been recognized in their fields through a 
professional certification program. Once those specialists are employed, the marginal cost 
to the governmental unit of providing services to additional residents is small. County or 
state governments may be well suited to employ these personnel and provide these 
services, since they can offer them to local units spread over a wide area. We therefore 
hypothesize that local governments will be more likely to engage in vertical cooperation 
on services that require technical expertise or training. We further hypothesize that local 
governments are most likely to self-provide basic government services, especially those 
that are labor-intensive and require relatively low levels of technical expertise.  
 
Horizontal and Vertical Cooperation among Michigan Municipal Governments 
We examine these propositions with data from a survey of municipal governments 
conducted by the Citizens Research Council of Michigan in 2005. A survey was mailed 
to the senior administrator in each city, village, and township government in 25 Michigan 
counties. Responses were received from 70 percent (460 units) of the governments 
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surveyed and were evenly distributed across the three types of jurisdictions.2 Survey 
respondents were asked to report the delivery mechanism for 115 services provided by 
the jurisdiction, grouped into 26 functional categories. For each service, the respondents 
were asked to indicate if their jurisdiction directly provides the service; provides to, has 
provided by, or jointly provides with another unit of government; provides through a 
special district; contracts with a private provider; or does not provide at all (CRC, 2005).3
We began our analysis by coding each of these services and functions according 
to the degree of labor- or capital-intensiveness, the need for technical expertise or 
training, and whether or not the service area is considered a basic service. Each function 
was coded in terms of the expected financial and technical burden placed on local 
governments initiating provision of the service. The capital-intensiveness of each service 
area was judged based on the cost of constructing, building, or acquiring the land, 
buildings, vehicles, or equipment needed to provide each service. The need for technical 
expertise or training was based on the need for the government to employ personnel with 
college degrees or professional certification to provide that service or function. Finally, 
basic services were defined as those services that citizens initiating establishment of a 
new government would expect that government to provide at a minimum. The coding of 
the services and functions is reported in Appendix A. 
Each of the 460 responding cities, villages and townships reported which services 
are provided to their residents and, if provided, the mode of service provision used. 
Appendix B lists each service/function and reports the number of municipalities reporting 
each provision mode. For our analyses, we collapsed each local government’s responses 
for each service area into four variables indicating whether or not the service was: (1) 
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provided alone; (2) via horizontal relationships; (3) via vertical relationships; and (4) not 
provided.4  These indicator variables serve as the dependent variables in our analyses. 
Table 1 reports the 20 most frequent services/functions reported for each service 
provision mode.  
Table 1 Here 
Self-provision is reported most often for basic labor-intensive functions such as 
purchasing, tax collection, accounting, elections, payroll, and records, as well as zoning, 
planning, and building code enforcement/ inspection/ permits, as hypothesized. 
Horizontal cooperation is reported most frequently for fire, library, utilities (water and 
sewer), emergency, and public transportation services. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
these are capital-intensive services or functions for which significant scale economies are 
likely to be present. Vertical cooperation is reported most frequently on criminal 
justice/courts, roads, animal control, emergency, environmental, and building regulation 
services. Some of these services, especially criminal justice/courts and road, reflect 
legislative or constitutional provisions that require high degrees of county involvement.5 
Other services, such as crime lab, emergency planning and environmental services, 
require relatively high levels of technical expertise or training.  
Two additional patterns emerge from table 1. First, very little overlap exists 
between these three lists of services. Only four services appear on two top-twenty lists, 
and none appear on all three. This suggests that different economic logics derive from 
each type of service, and these logics in part dictate decisions to engage in direct 
provision, horizontal cooperation, and vertical cooperation. Second, comparing the two 
forms of cooperation, there are only a few services where horizontal collaboration occurs 
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frequently, whereas vertical cooperation is reported both at much higher rates and in 
many more service areas. Indeed, horizontal cooperation is reported by more than 20 
percent of responding units in just 12 of the 116 service areas. In contrast, vertical 
cooperation is reported by more than 20 percent of responding units in 42 service areas.  
 
Analyses and Results 
To test our hypotheses, we merged a suite of additional variables into this service 
provision dataset. The additional variables include several indicators of community-level 
fiscal, demographic, and political factors, as well as regional characteristics such as the 
number of potential collaborators in the immediate area. We conduct separate analyses 
for the three modes of service provision examined.  
Examining our fiscal capacity hypotheses requires that we control for important 
differences in the institutional structure of municipal governments in Michigan. In 
general, cities have a greater ability to fund the services demanded by their residents than 
villages or townships because these governments are allowed, by state law and/or city 
charter, to levy higher property taxes than townships and villages, and to collect 
additional revenues not available to these other governments. To account for these 
differences, each model includes a dichotomous variable indicating if the municipal 
government is a city. Also, Michigan law permits township governments to adopt charter 
township status, which substantially enhances the fiscal resources available to them. 
Given the authority to raise additional funds, charter townships may act more like cities 
than general law townships in their decisions about service delivery arrangements. We 
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account for this possibility by including a dichotomous variable in the full models 
indicating if the unit is a charter township.  
For each service provision mode, we report findings from two sets of logistic 
regression models. The first set of models focus on the subset of three independent 
variables that operationalize our fiscal capacity hypotheses: a dichotomous variable 
indicating if the unit is a city (scored one for cities and zero for villages or townships), 
and the size of the unit’s tax base (measured as taxable value per capita and taxable value 
per capita, squared) available to support public services6. The second set of regression 
models adds several independent variables to fully operationalize our theoretical model 
and to test hypotheses about factors beyond fiscal capacity. Table 2 presents descriptive 
statistics and data sources for each of the independent variables. Having identified where 
fiscal capacity is strong in the first set of regressions, we limit these additional regression 
to those initial regressions where the fiscal capacity effects are strongest. These 
additional regressions therefore permit us to evaluate the impact of the additional factors 
while at the same time assessing the robustness of our fiscal capacity hypothesis.   
Table 2 Here 
 
Direct Provision 
We begin by examining the factors explaining self-provision of government services. We 
propose that: (1) local governments with high levels of fiscal capacity are likely to self-
provide government services; and (2) more populous local governments and (3) those 
with larger nonwhite and older populations are more likely to directly provide services. 
We first report limited logistic regressions for the twenty services for which local 
 13
governments most frequently reported self-provision. We then estimate the more fully 
specified models on a subset of ten services. 
Table 3 reports the logistic regression estimates for the models of direct provision 
of services. The dependent variable in each model is whether or not a given community 
reports directly providing the service in question. We use logistic regression because the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. Each row corresponds to the results of a separate 
logistic regression. The first results column reports the estimated coefficient for the 
variable measuring the type of municipal government. Positive coefficients indicate that 
cities are more likely than the other types of local governments (villages and townships) 
to self-provide the particular service. The findings show that cities are, indeed, more 
likely than townships and villages to directly provide all but three of the twenty services, 
reflecting the fact that city governments face demands for more services and are 
empowered with greater authority to raise funds to support direct service provision than 
are the other types of municipal governments. Given access to greater resources, cities 
tend to do more than other types of local governments.  
The coefficients reported in the second column of table 3 reveal the relationship 
between the unit’s TV/Capita and the likelihood of direct provision of the service. 
Positive coefficients indicate that the likelihood of direct provision is higher in 
communities with greater per capita property wealth. The findings show that when local 
fiscal capacity is measured in terms of TV/Capita, no consistent relationship with direct 
provision is seen for these twenty services. This suggests that for this set of basic 
government services, differences in property wealth across jurisdictions are not important 
considerations in their decision to self-provide.  
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The third variable in the models shown in table 3 is the unit’s population in 2000. 
As we hypothesized, more populous municipal governments are more likely to directly 
provide all but two of the listed services, and the effect is significant for 55 percent (11 of 
20) of the services. It is also interesting to note that the estimated effects tend to become 
more consistently significant as the proportion of local governments self-providing the 
service falls (i.e., as one moves down the list). We suspect that this is simply an artifact 
of the data. Given the high proportions of governments reporting self-provision of the 
first several services on the list, there is little variance to be explained by the variables in 
the model. 
Table 3 Here 
To assess the robustness of these preliminary results, and to test our additional 
hypotheses, we estimate more fully specified models for ten of these services. To account 
for the high proportion of governments reporting self-provision for several of the services 
in table 3, we estimate the fully specified models for the ten services from table 1 with 
the lowest rates of self-provision (items 11-20 on the list). The services examined are 
record keeping, election administration, building code enforcement, community planning, 
building permits, parks, fleet purchasing, fleet garage, property assessing, and building 
inspection.   
Table 4 reports the findings from these ten logistic regressions. Bold-faced entries 
highlight the preliminary hypotheses explored in table 2. As hypothesized, cities and 
charter townships are more likely than general law townships and villages to self-provide 
all of the ten services, as evidenced by the positive and often statistically significant 
estimates on the city and charter township variables. The findings also reveal that size 
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affects the direct provision choice in two different ways. First, more populous units are 
more likely to self-provide each service, and this effect is statistically significant for eight 
of the ten services. Second, the geographical scale of the unit is statistically related to 
reliance on direct provision in 60 percent (6 of 10) of the services. For three services 
(election administration, building permits, and property assessing) greater land area 
increases the likelihood of direct provision. For three others (parks, fleet purchasing, and 
fleet garage) more land area decreases the likelihood that municipal government directly 
provides the service. None of the other variables show consistent patterns across the ten 
services. 
Table 4 Here 
 
Horizontal Cooperation 
Next, we examine our hypotheses about the effect of local fiscal capacity, internal 
characteristics, and external factors on horizontal cooperation. We propose that: (1) cities 
will be more likely to engage in higher levels of horizontal cooperation; (2) communities 
in the mid range of fiscal capacity (TV/Capita) will be more likely to engage in 
horizontal cooperation, but (3) those at the highest levels of fiscal capacity (TV/Capita2) 
will be less constrained and therefore less likely to cooperate in providing municipal 
services; and (4) larger numbers of potential local government partners will increase the 
likelihood of horizontal cooperation.  
Table 5 reports our analysis of the relationship between fiscal capacity and 
horizontal cooperation for the 20 service areas where the highest levels of horizontal 
cooperation were reported in table 1. The dependent variable in each model is whether a 
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given community reports any incidence of horizontal cooperation for the service in 
question.7 The first column of results reports the estimated coefficient for the variable 
measuring the type of municipal government. The findings are largely consistent with our 
expectations about municipal structure. The city dummy variable is positive for 70 
percent (14 of 20) of the services examined, and is positive and statistically significant in 
60 percent (12 of 20) of them.8 However, these findings reveal that municipal structure 
affects the likelihood of cooperation on fire services differently than for other services. 
Only six services display a negative sign for the structure variable, and all are services 
related to fire protection and EMS. Four of the models have structure coefficients that are 
negative and statistically significant, indicating that townships and villages are more 
likely to engage in horizontal cooperation on fire fighting, fire inspection, fire hydrant 
maintenance, and EMS than are cities. We note that this finding is independent of the 
level of property wealth in the jurisdiction (since we control for TV/Capita). Townships 
and villages are more likely to cooperate horizontally on these fire services than are 
cities, regardless of the per capita tax base in the community.  
Table 5 Here  
The coefficients reported in the second column of table 5 reveal the relationship 
between the unit’s TV/Capita and the likelihood of horizontal cooperation. For many of 
the services examined, the coefficients indicate that horizontal cooperation is more likely 
in communities with greater fiscal capacity. The coefficient for this variable is positive in 
70 percent (14 of 20) of the services examined, and is positive and significant in 50 
percent (10 of 20) of them.9 Most of the services that are positive and significant are 
capital-intensive to varying degrees, and include water and sewer utilities, transit, and 
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library services. Once again, the relationship between fiscal capacity and horizontal 
cooperation is different for fire services. Five of the six fire services examined have 
negative coefficients for TV/Capita, although none is statistically significant.  
The third results column reports the estimated coefficient for the third measure of 
local fiscal capacity, TV/Capita2. The findings largely confirm our expectations about the 
behavior of high capacity jurisdictions. The coefficient shows a negative relationship in 
75 percent (15 of 20) of the services, and is negative and significant in 45 percent (9 of 
20) of them.10 Municipal governments with the greatest fiscal capacity, as measured by 
the value of their property tax base, are less likely to engage in horizontal cooperation. 
Again, the major exception to this conclusion is for the group of fire services. One 
explanation for this finding is that the nature of fire protection services as a basic service 
may mean that communities feel compelled to provide fire protection and will enter into 
cooperative ventures with neighbors regardless of their fiscal capacity. 
To assess the robustness of these preliminary results, and to test our additional 
hypotheses, we estimate more fully specified models for the ten capital-intensive services 
with the highest levels of horizontal cooperation, excluding services related to fire 
fighting and fire protection. The services examined are library, water treatment, sewer 
treatment, water distribution, sewer collection, emergency dispatch, dial-a-ride service, 
gas metering, bus service, and senior center. Table 6 reports the results of these ten 
logistic regression analyses. 
Table 6 Here 
The effects of government type and property wealth on horizontal cooperation are 
robust to the inclusion of our other independent variables. In no case does the relationship 
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of the three fiscal capacity measures with horizontal cooperation change when the 
additional variables are included. In several service areas, one or more of the measures 
become statistically insignificant, but many significant effects remain in the full models. 
As expected, the charter township variable is positive in eight of the equations and 
strongly significant in seven. This indicates that charter townships are more likely than 
general law townships and villages to engage in horizontal cooperation on these services. 
Given that the full model also includes a measure of the unit’s population, this finding is 
independent of the population of the township. This finding strongly supports our 
propositions about fiscal capacity and horizontal cooperation. The enhanced resources 
available to charter townships appear to make these governments more attractive partners 
in horizontal collaborations. 
The findings provide little evidence that greater numbers of potential 
collaborators stimulate horizontal cooperation. In fact, the limited evidence for a 
relationship points in the other direction: horizontal cooperation is less likely in highly 
fragmented areas. The number of cities in a unit’s county is negatively related to the 
likelihood of horizontal cooperation, with negative signs in all but two service areas, but 
significant effects in only three. This may indicate that scale economies are more easily 
reached within a single local government jurisdiction in densely populated regions. It also 
may reflect the intensity of competition for tax base created when many small cities are 
incorporated in close proximity to one another. Krueger (2005) argues that the best 
candidates for joint service provision are often the same governments that a local unit 
most directly competes with for residents and economic development. None of the 
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coefficients for population size, population change, land area, or population 
characteristics show consistently signed or significant effects across the ten service areas.  
 
Vertical Cooperation 
Finally, we test our hypotheses about the factors explaining vertical cooperation between 
municipal governments and county and/or state governments. We propose that: (1) 
townships and villages are more likely to partner with county or state government to 
provide services; (2) local governments with lower fiscal capacity are more likely to 
engage in vertical cooperation; and (3) communities at the highest levels of taxable value 
are less likely to need to cooperate on service provision with the county or state 
governments. The dependent variable in all of the analyses is whether a given community 
reports any incidence of vertical cooperation on the service in question.  
Table 7 reports our analysis of the relationship between fiscal capacity and 
vertical cooperation for the 20 service areas in table 1 with the highest levels of vertical 
cooperation, with several important exceptions. It is reasonable to believe that the high 
rates of vertical cooperation on road construction and maintenance and the operation of 
district courts are due to legislative and constitutional requirements for county 
involvement and not necessarily the choices of local decision-makers to work 
cooperatively with counties. We therefore exclude the six services from these two areas 
from the analyses that follow.11 The next six most frequently reported areas of vertical 
cooperation shown in table 1 - detective/crime investigation units, curbside mowing, 
police officer training, environmental education, hazardous material handling, and police 
street patrols - replace the excluded services. As with the analysis of the first two service 
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provision modes, we begin our analysis of vertical cooperation with a series of limited 
models that focus on our fiscal capacity hypotheses. We later add the same set of 
additional variables used in the previous analyses of direct provision and horizontal 
cooperation to test our other hypotheses on this subset of services. 
Table 7 Here 
Table 7 shows that cities are less likely than townships or villages to engage in 
vertical cooperation for 85 percent (17 of 20) of the services, and are significantly less 
likely for 70 percent (14 of 20) of them. This finding is consistent with our predictions 
for the effect of municipal structure on the likelihood of vertical cooperation. However, 
property wealth is a much less important determinant of vertical cooperation, as indicated 
by the statistically insignificant effect of TV/Capita in 75 percent (15 of 20) of the 
services examined. Indeed, in the few instances where the coefficient on TV/Capita is 
significant, it is positive in four cases and negative in only one. Similarly, TV/Capita2 is 
significant only once, indicating little evidence of a drop-off in vertical cooperation for 
communities with the greatest fiscal capacity. Together, these findings suggest that local 
fiscal capacity, when measured in terms of property wealth, is not an important factor in 
local units’ decisions to cooperate with the county or the state to provide services. 
Instead, it is the legal and constitutional capacity of the local government to generate the 
resources to pay for public services that is central to this decision. The limited fiscal 
capacity of township and village governments created by their limited tax authority is 
strongly related to the decision to cooperate with the county or state governments on this 
set of services.12  
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Table 8 reports the findings from our more fully specified models. We proposed 
that vertical cooperation is strongly motivated by the ability of counties and the state 
government to serve as providers of services that require technical training or expertise. 
To test this hypothesis, we limit the analysis to the ten services from table 7 that demand 
high levels of technical training or expertise, and therefore present the greatest 
opportunities for exploiting “economies of skill.” Beginning with the two measures of 
municipal fiscal authority, the findings show that cities are more likely than general law 
townships and villages to undertake vertical cooperation on half of the services and are 
less likely on the other half. More consistently, charter townships are more likely to 
cooperate vertically on each and every service area, and are significantly more likely to 
report vertical cooperation on six of the policies. Charter townships tend to be more 
fiscally constrained than cities because they have fewer mills available to levy, but often 
have service demands on par with cities. They may need to seek out opportunities to 
cooperate on these technical services to greater degrees than cities.  
Table 8 Here 
The other major fiscal capacity variable – TV/Capita – is consistently positive, 
but rarely statistically significant. This finding confirms and extends the major conclusion 
of the reduced model. Fiscal capacity in terms of per capita taxable value is not 
instrumental to the decisions to cooperate on service provision with the county or state 
governments for this set of services, even when jurisdictional differences in population, 
land area, and demographic characteristics are considered. These latter factors are also 
largely unimportant to this decision in most communities, as indicated by the general lack 
of statistically significant coefficients for these factors in the ten models. We had 
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proposed that local governments with lower fiscal capacity, whether measured in terms of 
tax base or municipal powers, are more likely to engage in vertical cooperation. 
However, these findings provide little support for our contention about the effect of 
TV/Capita on vertical cooperation for this set of services. It is not the ability of the 
community to afford service provision that determines whether local governments 
cooperate vertically to provide these services, but rather whether they possess the fiscal 
authority to raise the funds necessary to support the service.  
Finally, the findings in table 8 show that the number of cities per county is 
negative in all ten models and statistically significant in six, indicating that units in 
counties with many municipal governments are less likely to engage in vertical 
cooperation. This finding follows the negative relationship found for this factor in the 
models of horizontal cooperation and provides an even stronger case for the cooperation-
depressing effects of municipal fragmentation. Fewer municipal governments in an area 
often translate into greater interlocal cooperation, whether the potential partners are other 
cities, villages, townships, the county, or state government. An unexpected finding is that 
the negative effect of other municipal governments on cooperation is stronger for vertical 
than for horizontal relationships.  
 
Discussion and Implications of Analysis 
Analysis of the Citizen’s Research Council of Michigan’s survey of local government 
services shows clear patterns in the methods used to deliver local government services. 
The direct provision of services is the method used most frequently, especially for labor-
intensive services and functions basic to local government such as purchasing, tax 
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collection, accounting, elections, payroll, and records, as well as zoning, planning, and 
building code enforcement/inspection/permits, as hypothesized. A governmental unit’s 
fiscal capacity does little to predict whether services will be directly provided. As the 
population within a local jurisdiction increases, the number of services provided expands, 
and the new services tend to remain self-provided. Cities and charter townships, which 
tend to act more like cities than general law townships in the methods used to provide 
services, tend to provide more services, and thus self-provide services to greater degrees 
than general law townships or villages.  
At some point in the expansion of services, local governments are confronted with 
demands for capital-intensive services and services that require professionals with 
technical expertise or training that impose significant costs on the provider. Our analysis 
shows that the nature of the services plays an important role in local governments’ 
decisions to look among their neighbors for partners (horizontal cooperation) or seek to 
benefit from the capacity of the state or county governments (vertical cooperation).  
Horizontal cooperation occurs most frequently for the provision of services that 
require significant capital investment. Fire prevention, libraries, water and sewer, public 
transit, and senior centers all require investment for the construction of buildings and 
infrastructure or the purchase of vehicles and equipment. These costs can often act as 
significant deterrents for local governments to engage in the activity alone, but 
economies can be gained by cooperating with other units confronting the same costs.  
Vertical cooperation occurs more often for the provision of services that require 
significant labor investment in professionals with technical expertise or training. 
Common examples include county-local emergency planning, animal control, and 
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environmental initiatives. The costs of employing those individuals that warrant higher 
pay scales due to their levels of expertise or training can act as deterrents for local 
governments to provide those services individually, but economies can be gained by 
cooperating or piggybacking on the employment of those individuals at higher levels of 
government. A decision to join with other relatively small and lightly populated local 
governments does not create the economies needed to fund some services and functions; 




These differences suggest a strategy for local officials hoping to benefit from 
intergovernmental cooperation and for state policymakers hoping to promote 
collaboration among local governments. The patterns of cooperation we observe – 
including the types of local governments who engage in collaborative service provision, 
the partners they choose, the forms of cooperation they undertake, and the kinds of joint 
services they deliver – are largely consistent with the logic of cooperation laid out in our 
theory and hypotheses. While our analysis does not contain explicit cost data that would 
allow us to determine whether these arrangements are enhancing economic efficiency, the 
fact that a great many Michigan local governments are behaving as the theory suggests 
indicates, to us at least, that these forms of cooperation make sense to decision-makers on 
the ground. By learning from and building upon the experiences of local governments 
across the state, and by working to promote similar forms of cooperation in other 
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localities, we believe that state and local policymakers stand the greatest chances of 
success in promoting viable cooperation.  
Local Actions 
A necessary first step for local government officials hoping to promote intergovernmental 
cooperation is to examine the nature of the services considered for collaboration. Services 
should be classified according to whether they are primarily capital-intensive, labor-
intensive, and technically-intensive. Within broad service provision categories, individual 
functions should also be examined to consider whether opportunities for cooperation 
exist for a subset of services within a broad category. For example, police protection 
tends to be fairly labor-intensive and hence not especially conducive to collaboration, but 
more specific functions such as detective work and crime scene investigation tend to be 
technically-intensive and detention facilities are capital-intensive. While joint provision 
of police protection might not create significant opportunities for cooperation, creation of 
joint crime scene units or detention facilities may offer greater saving opportunities. 
County governments should also assess the services they provide to identify opportunities 
for new or expanded vertical collaborations.  
A second step is to identify potential partners for collaboration. By understanding 
that capital-intensive services are especially sensitive to geographic characteristics, local 
government officials can begin by building horizontal relationships with neighboring 
communities. Similarly, by understanding that technically intensive services are not 
geographically based but can be provided on an as-needed basis across counties and local 
units, efforts to collaborate can begin by investigating state and county governments’ 
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ability to provide those services on behalf of local governments through vertical 
cooperation.  
Identification of a suitable partner for horizontal and vertical cooperation requires 
consideration of different factors. We find that cities and charter townships are more 
likely than general law townships or villages to engage in horizontal cooperation. As 
hypothesized, the likelihood of horizontal cooperation increases in communities with 
greater fiscal capacity; but local governments with the greatest fiscal capacity are less 
likely to engage in horizontal cooperation. These findings suggest that communities with 
mid-range fiscal capacity should seek out neighbors in similar fiscal circumstances for 
cooperative ventures. Notwithstanding the cooperative ventures that currently exist 
among local governments – especially in fire protection and library services – those 
governmental units with severely limited fiscal capacity are unlikely to find promising 
opportunities for horizontal cooperation, since neither they nor their resource-poor 
neighbors are able to provide capital-intensive services, either individually or jointly. 
Our analysis of trends in vertical cooperation shows that a local government’s 
fiscal conditions are not the driving factor behind their decisions to engage in vertical 
cooperation with their county or the state. Property-rich communities are just as likely as 
poor or mid-range communities to use vertical cooperation.  
These findings suggest that opportunities exist for expansion of vertical 
cooperation between counties and their constituent cities, villages, and townships, 
regardless of the fiscal capacity of those local governments. Officials representing local 
governments of all size and fiscal capacity should consider their county governments as 
potential service providers, either by piggybacking on existing county services or through 
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interlocal contracts to have the county provide functions and services that are currently 
self-provided.  
A third step is for local governments to acknowledge that horizontal collaboration 
represents mutual exchange relationships between local units who seek to jointly provide 
services that neither unit would or could individually provide as efficiently. Each 
participant expects the other(s) to contribute their “fair share” to the financing of the 
governmental service, and in return, both are made better off through cost savings and 
perhaps improved service provision. To achieve these benefits, a successful cooperative 
relationship requires participants to put aside their instincts towards competition for tax 
base in the mutual interest of improved, more economical service provision.  
Competition for tax base is less salient as local governments seek partners for 
vertical collaboration. Because city and township residents are simultaneously state and 
county residents, vertical collaboration may be in the interest of all participating units. 
Indeed, by acting to improve the service provision capabilities of a county’s weakest 
units, county officials can make the county as a whole a more attractive place to live or 
locate a business.  
State Policies 
State programs can be designed to promote greater horizontal and vertical collaboration. 
The state should not attempt to mold a uniform policy to promote cooperation – such 
programs should recognize the underlying differences in logic and motivations behind 
vertical and horizontal cooperation.  
State policies designed to promote and facilitate horizontal cooperation should 
emphasize the capital-intensive nature of the services best suited for horizontal 
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cooperation and the need for local government officials to find near-by municipalities 
interested in cooperating. Our analysis finds that local governments most often engage in 
horizontal cooperation to provide capital-intensive services. Once the capital-intensive 
good is purchased, acquired or constructed, the marginal cost of providing services to 
additional residents, such as those in a neighboring community, are relatively small.   
Given the benefits of horizontal cooperation in the provision of capital-intensive 
services, the state can best promote cooperation by reducing the cost of capital items for 
those local governments cooperating in the provision of services. One method for 
accomplishing this would be for the state to create a loan fund or sinking fund from 
which cooperating local governments could borrow or bond to acquire, purchase, or 
construct the capital-intensive items at lower cost than if they were to do so on their own.  
The second part of the state’s efforts to facilitate horizontal cooperation should 
concentrate on the helping local governments identify and create agreements with willing 
partners. The state could provide consultation to those local officials seeking to initiate 
cooperative ventures; collect and disseminate information about research and best 
practices on intergovernmental cooperation; offer arbitration and/or training to local 
government officials; advocate for additional resources to local governments within and 
outside state government; administer grant and incentive programs; and maintain a 
moderated website where local governments can identify potential service sharing 
partners and learn from others’ experiences. The state government can work to remove 
barriers to cooperation by helping with the cost of negotiating, planning, and 
implementing a cooperative agreement. And it could do more to standardize the financial 
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reporting for local governments so that such negotiations and planning begin with all 
parties in agreement about the finances of such a cooperative venture.  
State policies to promote vertical cooperation should recognize that cities, 
villages, and townships of all sizes and fiscal capacity can benefit by working with the 
state or their county governments to provide services. The potential role of the state in 
providing incentives for vertical cooperation is far different than the potential role for 
horizontal cooperation. The state need not help with the process of identifying potential 
partners, since information about the services that state and county governments can 
provide is more readily accessible to local governments. Also, because the state and 
counties are already actively engaged in the provision of services to local units, 
contracting may be more routinized and negotiation over vertical cooperation tends to be 
limited to the level of services and the cost. Unlike horizontal cooperation, there is little 
need for the state to provide resources to help with planning, negotiating or 
implementation of cooperative agreements. And there is little need for the state to help 
with the cost of acquiring, purchasing, or constructing items as is the case for horizontal 
cooperation. 
Instead, the state could provide financial incentives for local governments to work 
with the state or their county governments for the provision of services. Incentives could 
be directed to the cities, villages, and townships to motivate contracting with their county 
governments for the provision of specific services, or to the counties to defray the cost of 
providing specific services, and thus reducing their costs below what most municipalities 
would pay to self-provide the same services. Vertical relationships could also be created 
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Intergovernmental cooperation is increasingly seen as a tool for local governments to deal 
with the operational and fiscal pressures created by Michigan’s continued economic 
troubles and by state actions to fund its services using dollars that would otherwise be 
passed on to local governments through state revenue sharing. The analyses in this 
chapter provide policymakers with insights regarding what sorts of intergovernmental 
cooperation can and should be facilitated through legislation and policy, and offer 
guidance to practitioners for assessing the potential for cooperation in their communities. 
We believe our examination of horizontal and vertical cooperation and direct provision 
will provide analysts with tools for better understanding and evaluating the incidence of 




                                                 
1A fifth option is contracting for the service with a nongovernmental provider. The 
decision to use a private or nonprofit provider is beyond the scope of the current analysis. 
2 The surveys were mailed in winter 2005 to every city, village, and township government 
in 25 Michigan counties. These 646 units of government represent 36 percent of the 
1,776 general-purpose local governments in Michigan and contain 78 percent of the 
state’s population. Responses were received from 460 of the 646 governments surveyed, 
for a response rate of 71 percent. Response rates for each type of government were: 71 
percent for cities (113 of 160); 70 percent for villages (58 of 83); and 72 percent for 
townships (289 of 403). For additional information, see 
www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2000s/2005/catalog.html. 
3For each service, respondents were provided twelve options and asked to choose the one 
that best described their unit’s service delivery arrangements. Respondent were asked to 
choose multiple responses only when necessary. Responses were then combined into four 
clusters for analysis, as described in the text. The survey response options were: (1) Does 
not provide or contract for this service-this service is not the responsibility of, and 
therefore is not provided by, your city/village/township. (2) Directly provides this 
service-your unit is providing this service using municipal employees. (3) Also provides 
this service by contract to residents of another community-your city/village/township is 
providing this service, through some sort of contract or agreement, to another 
community. This would usually be in addition to providing the service within your own 
city/village/township. (4) Jointly provides this service with another municipality-your 
city/village/township has entered into an agreement with a neighboring 
city/village/township to cooperatively provide this service. (5) Jointly provides this 
service with a school district-your city/village/township has entered into an agreement 
with a school district to jointly provide this service. (6) Jointly provides this service with 
the county-your city/village/township has entered into an agreement with the county to 
jointly provide this service. (7) Has this service provided by the state-your 
city/village/township contracts with the state to provide this service. (8) Has this service 
provided by the county-your county provides this service on a county-wide basis. (9) Has 
the service provided by another municipality-your city/village/township has some sort of 
agreement or contract with another city/village/township to have that unit deliver this 
service. (10) Has this service provided by a special authority or special district-your 
city/village/township has joined a special authority with other units of local government 
to provide this service. (11) Has this service provided by a private provider-your 
city/village/township has hired, or contracted with, or has a franchise agreement with, a 
nongovernmental private firm -- for-profit or non-profit -- to provide this service. (12) Do 
not know how this service is provided-you are unaware if this service is being provided 
by another governmental entity, but your city/village/township is not currently providing 
this service. 
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4This coding again ignores service delivery via nongovernmental providers as an option. 
We consider joint provision with, and service provision by, special authorities or districts 
as instances of horizontal cooperation. 
5When the Great Depression in the 1930s left many townships unable to fund road 
maintenance, the role of county road commissions was expanded to include care of 
township roads. Only one township has since returned to the role of caring for its own 
roads (see CRC 1997). Also, adoption of the 1963 Michigan Constitution mandated 
certain changes in the structure of the state judiciary. Specifically, Article VI, Section 26, 
required that the offices of circuit court commissioner and justice of the peace be 
abolished and a court or courts of limited jurisdiction be created by the legislature. Public 
Act 154 of 1968 carried out that mandate and vested control of court districts with the 
legislature. These services were excluded from the analysis. 
6In our initial analyses of direct provision (table 2), we include population size rather than 
TV/Capita2. 
7If a community reports one or more forms of horizontal cooperation on a given service, 
it is coded “one” on the dependent variable. Given the structure of the data, when a 
community reports more than one instance of horizontal cooperation on a given service, 
we cannot differentiate between collaborations on a single service delivery with multiple 
partners, versus multiple distinct instances of service delivery with different partners. The 
measures used for vertical cooperation and direct provision is constructed in a similar 
manner. 
8Table 5 reports models estimated for the 20 service areas where the greatest incidence of 
horizontal cooperation was reported. We also estimated the same models for the 
remaining 95 service areas where the incidence of horizontal cooperation was lower. In 
these additional models, the coefficient on City is positive and significant in only 28% 
(27 out of 95) of the service areas. 
9In the additional models estimated for services with horizontal cooperation (see Endnote 
8), the TV/Capita coefficient is significant in only 12% (11 of 95) of the remaining 
services. 
10In the additional models (see Endnote 8), the TV/Capita2 coefficient and is negative and 
significant in just 2% (2 of 95) of the other services for which horizontal cooperation was 
reported. 
11See Endnote 5 above. 
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Table 1: Top Twenty Service Areas by Mode of Service Delivery 
 
Self Provision Pct Horizontal  Pct  Vertical Pct 
Purchasing 96.30 Fire Fighting 47.39 Jail(s) 77.17
Tax Collection 95.87 Fire Training 41.96 Animal Control 72.17
Treasury 94.09 Library 39.78 Road Signs 70.87
Accounting 93.90 Hazmat 38.04 Detention Center(s) 69.13
Election Records 90.43 Water Treatment 35.65 Crime Lab 68.04
Zoning 88.48 Sewer Treatment 34.35 Road Building 65.43
Payroll 88.02 Ambulance 33.70 Emergency Planning 64.78
Records 86.27 Fire Inspection 32.17 Animal Licenses 64.57
Election Admin 85.00 Fire Investigation 31.74 Well Permitting 63.91
Document Destruction 77.14 Water Distribution 27.39 District Court 63.70
Bldg Code Enforce 74.57 Sewer Collection 25.87 Road Winter Maint 63.70
Printing 73.90 Fire Hydrants 23.04 Road Maintenance 63.48
Community Planning 68.48 Police - 911/Radio 17.83 Septic Permitting  62.17
Building Permits 67.61 Emergency Planning 17.17 Police - 911/Radio  62.17
Building Janitors 66.74 Dial-a-Ride 16.30 Restaurant Licensing 61.52
Parks 66.16 Watershed Mgmt 15.43 Water quality 57.39
Fleet Purchasing 65.28 Gas Metering 15.43 Erosion Control 55.00
Fleet Garage 64.63 Bus Service 14.57 Watershed Mgmt  53.48
Property Assessing 63.91 Senior Center 13.91 Air Quality 52.83
Building Inspection 63.48 Elections Admin 13.04 Police - Canine Unit 51.30
NOTE: Pct indicates the percentage of 460 municipal governments (cities, villages, and 
township) reporting each mode of service delivery in 2005.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Independent Variables 
 
Variable Mean Min Max Source 
City .25 0 1 Michigan Municipal 
League (MML) 
TV/Capita 33,013 3,869 198,316 MI Dept of Treasury 
 
TV/Capita2 1.58e+09 1.50e+07 3.93e+10 MI Dept of Treasury 
 
Pop 2000 13,258 130 951,270 US Census of Population 
 
Pct Ch Pop 
1990-2000 




24.35 .1 175.2 US Census of Population 
Income/Cap 
2000 
23,325 11,394 110,683 US Census of Population 
Pct Afr Am 
2000 
3.51 0 81.55 US Census of Population 
Pct Elderly 
2000 
11.83 4.14 33.41 US Census of Population 
Charter Twp 
 
.14 0 1 MML 
Cities/County 
 
12.83 1 39 MML 
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Table 3: Local Fiscal Capacity and the Likelihood of Direct Provision of Services in 
460 Michigan Local Governments 
 
Service City TV/Capita Population 2000 
Purchasing .86 7.20e-06 3.45e-06 
Tax Collection -.33 .000041* .000019 
Treasury 1.057* .000042** -5.39e-06 
Accounting .46 -5.79e-07 .000026 
Election Records .93* .000035** .000036 
Zoning 1.28** .000031** .000097** 
Payroll 1.25** -7.24e-06 5.13e-06 
Records 1.72** 2.00e-06 .000039* 
Election Admin 1.26** .000013 .000032* 
Document Destruction .34 -6.66e-06 7.37e-06 
Bldg Code Enforcement 1.41** 9.25e-06 .00011*** 
Printing .21 6.41e-06 9.14e-06 
Community Planning 1.076** -8.32e-06* .000044** 
Building Permits .53* 8.89e-06* .000085*** 
Building Janitors -.19 -3.63e-06 -3.28e-06 
Parks 2.65*** -.000013** .000045** 
Fleet Purchasing 2.15*** -5.37e-06 .000067*** 
Fleet Garage 2.83*** -1.56e-06 .000050** 
Property Assessing -.21 8.26e-06 .000062*** 
Building Inspection .49* 5.51e-06 .00014*** 
NOTES: Values reported in cells are coefficients from logistic regression.  
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10 
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Table 4: Likelihood of Direct Provision of Services in 460 Michigan Local 
Governments – Full Model 
 








City 1.98** 2.73*** .85* 1.39** .54 
TV/Capita -.000017 -.000019 8.33e-06 2.70e-06 -.000018 
TV/Capita2 3.66e-11 1.25e-10 4.43e-11 -1.57e-10* 1.43e-10 
Pop 2000 .000028 1.92e-06 .000097** .000028* .000056** 
Pct Ch Pop .020* .00075 -.00056 -.0031 .0037 
Land Area .0070 .047*** -.0050 -.0043 .012* 
Income/Cap .000036 .000045 -.000029 .000043** 6.38e-06 
Pct Afr Am -.0057 .011 .020 .0071 .0030 
Pct Elderly .032 .0017 .063* -.022 .043 
Charter Twp .072 1.33** .26 .81** .72* 
Cities/County .00025 -.023 .059** -.023* .048** 
Constant .27 -.28 -.53 .00044 -1.00 
R2 .09 .15 .17 .10 .13 








City 2.31*** 2.010*** 2.50*** 2.61*** .64* 
TV/Capita 8.00e-06 -.000024 -2.89e-06 -.000012 -7.32e-06 
TV/Capita2 -1.03e-10 7.03e-11 3.00e-11 1.56e-10 7.03e-11 
Pop 2000 .000036** .000046** .000052** .000086*** .000012*** 
Pct Ch Pop .0031 .013* -.0066 .0039 .0027 
Land Area -.022** -.017** -.025** .077*** .0079 
Income/Cap -.000023 1.82e-06 -.000016 .000031 -6.62e-06 
Pct Afr Am .012 -.0090 -.014 -.014 -.0051 
Pct Elderly .035 .089** .053 -.019 .021 
Charter Twp .35 1.44** .93** .57 .83* 
Cities/County .0022 -.0047 -.014 -.086*** .022 
Constant .54 -.26 .50 -1.79** -.84 
R2 .19 .21 .22 .28 .17 
NOTES: Values reported in cells are coefficients from logistic regression.  




Table 5: Local Fiscal Capacity and the Likelihood of Horizontal Service 










Fire Fighting -.78** -.000011 6.28e-11 
Fire Training -.14 -5.31e-06 3.63e-11 
Library .47** .000023* -1.15e-10* 
Hazmat .47** 7.98e-06 -2.53e-11 
Water Treatment 1.47*** .000045*** -2.38e-10** 
Sewer Treatment 1.11*** .000057*** -2.95e-10** 
Ambulance -.67** -.000013 9.34e-11 
Fire Inspection -.87** -6.70e-06 9.56e-11 
Fire Investigation -.37 -7.65e-06 6.68e-11 
Water Distribution .73** .000037** -1.79e-10** 
Sewer Collection .45* .000036** -1.72e-10** 
Fire Hydrants -1.52*** 8.49e-06 -3.44e-11 
Police - 911/Radio 1.24*** .000021 -8.79e-11 
Emergency Planning .60** .000032** -1.85e-10* 
Dial-a-Ride 1.57*** .000075** -5.32e-10** 
Watershed Mgmt 1.21*** .000026* -1.26e-10 
Gas Metering  .29 .000019 -8.43e-11 
Bus Service 2.00*** .000073** -6.68e-10* 
Senior Center .82** .000048** -2.35e-10** 
Elections Admin .15 -1.52e-06 -5.48e-11 
NOTES: Values reported in cells are coefficients from logistic regression.  
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10 
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Table 6: Likelihood of Horizontal Service Arrangements in 460 Michigan Local 
Governments – Full Model 
 








City .29 1.36*** 1.15** 1.15** 1.04** 
TV/Capita .000027* .000036** .000046** .000030* .000027* 
TV/Capita2 -2.05e-10** -2.52e-10** -3.00e-10** -1.41e-10 -1.23e-10 
Pop 2000 -9.33e-07 7.09e-06 .000011 .000012* .000012* 
Pct Ch Pop -.010* -.0057 -.0073 -.0025 -.0026 
Land Area -.015** -.011 .0019 -.0013 .012 
Income/Cap .000046** .000031 .000034* .000018 .000013 
Pct Afr Am -.0070 .021 .0082 .0052 -.0028 
Pct Elderly -.058* -.015 .013 -.063* -.025 
Charter Twp -.53 1.41*** 1.26*** 1.34*** 1.31*** 
Cities/County -.019 -.0060 -.0092 -.028** -.023* 
Constant -.60 -2.33*** -3.19*** -1.73** -2.40*** 
R2 .049 .16 .14 .11 .09 




Bus Service Senior 
Center 
City .28 2.040*** .71* 2.73*** 1.089** 
TV/Capita .000038** .00011** .000033 .000079* .000048** 
TV/Capita2 -2.09e-10** -7.27e-10** -1.47e-10 -8.22e-10* -2.63e-10** 
Pop 2000 3.16e-06 6.85e-08 6.16e-06 -7.09e-07 -.000018 
Pct Ch Pop -.021** -.0093 -.0069 -.0062 -.0015 
Land Area -.042*** -.00088 -.012 .00094 .00018 
Income/Cap .000016 -.000020 4.92e-06 .000027 6.41e-06 
Pct Afr Am .017 .022 .013 .027* -.043 
Pct Elderly -.076* -.027 -.0063 -.027 .021 
Charter Twp -.014 1.25** 1.60*** 1.92*** .22 
Cities/County .0064 -.017 -.059*** -.011 .0012 
Constant -1.16* -4.099*** -2.19** -4.97*** -3.55*** 
R2 .13 .16 .10 .23 .07 
NOTES: Values reported in cells are coefficients from logistic regression.  
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10 
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Table 7: Local Fiscal Capacity and the Likelihood of Vertical Service Arrangements 
in 460 Michigan Local Governments 
 
Service City TV/Capita TV/Capita2
Animal Control -.91** 3.73e-06 -7.59e-11 
Detention Center -.44* 3.17e-06 -4.18e-11 
Crime Lab .54** .000016 -6.40e-11 
Emergency Planning .19 -1.15e-06 -2.90e-11 
Animal Licenses -.95** -9.86e-06 -5.09e-12 
Well Permitting -1.95*** .000028** -1.02e-10 
Septic Permitting -2.035*** .000028** -1.34e-11 
Police – 911/Radio -1.60*** -.000026** 1.53e-10 
Restaurant Licenses 1.13*** .000013 -1.02e-10 
Water Quality -.54** .000028** -1.27e-10 
Erosion Control -.31 .000011 -4.82e-11 
Watershed Mgmt -.57** 8.65e-06 -4.06e-11 
Air Quality -.0037 .000015 -6.55e-11 
Police – Canine Unit -1.065*** -.000010 9.49e-11 
Detective/ Investigation -1.73*** -5.15e-06 3.09e-11 
Curbside Mowing -2.64*** .000047** -3.57e-10** 
Police Officer Training -.34 -.000011 5.19e-11 
Environ Education -.44** 3.36e-06 -3.26e-11 
Hazmat -.27 4.30e-06 -4.40e-11 
Police – Street Patrol -2.93*** 6.16e-06 -1.53e-11 
NOTES: Values reported in cells are coefficients from logistic regression. ***p < .01; 
**p < .05; *p < .10 
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Table 8: Likelihood of Vertical Service Arrangements in 460 Michigan Local 












City .071 .063 -.11 -.94** -.78** 
TV/Capita .000031 .000030* 6.49e-06 9.92e-06 .000011 
TV/Capita2 -8.94e-11 -9.47e-11 -3.19e-11 7.25e-12 1.76e-11 
Pop 2000 -6.77e-06 -.000019** -7.68e-06 -4.27e-06 -3.54e-06 
Pct Ch Pop .011 .00088 .0045 .012 .0097 
Land Area -.011 -.012 -.0037 .021** .029** 
Income/Cap -.000044* -.000036* -.000017 .000010 -5.83e-06 
Pct Afr Am -.012 .022 -.0022 -.011 -.027 
Pct Elderly -.055 -.045 -.046 -.049 -.057* 
Charter Twp .72* .45 .51 .53 .76** 
Cities/County -.065*** -.024** -.056*** -.027** -.030** 
Constant 2.84*** 2.032*** 2.20*** .61 .79 
R2 .15 .06 .11 .17 .21 










City -.26 .33 .20 -.73** .31 
TV/Capita -.000015 .000030** 3.30e-06 -.000013 3.69e-06 
TV/Capita2 1.61e-10* -1.15e-10 2.92e-11 5.29e-11 -1.58e-11 
Pop 2000 -.000037** -.000020** -6.61e-06 -.000055*** -.000019** 
Pct Ch Pop .0041 -.0011 -.000063 .016** .0016 
Land Area .0063 .0013 .0053 .0058 -.00020 
Income/Cap -.000016 -2.28e-06 -7.94e-06 .000019 -6.54e-06 
Pct Afr Am -.016 -.012 -.22* -.0095 -.011 
Pct Elderly -.035 -.062** -.082** -.056* -.034 
Charter Twp 1.31** .98** .69** .46 .97** 
Cities/County -.052*** -.017 -.012 -.019 -.016 
Constant 2.33*** .55 1.18** .99* .47 
R2 .18 .06 .04 .16 .04 
NOTES: Values reported in cells are coefficients from logistic regression. ***p < .01; 




Appendix A: Coding of Services in CRC Survey, 2005  









Printing of Municipal Documents 3 1 1 
Records/Archives 3 1 1 
Document Destruction 1 1 1 
Training/Professional Development 1 1 2 
Payroll/Benefits 3 1 2 
Property Assessing 3 1 3 
Treasury Functions 3 1 3 
Tax Collection 3 1 3 
Accounting 3 1 3 
Purchasing 3 1 2 
Management Information Systems 1 1 3 
Geographic Information Systems 1 2 2/3 
Website Development/Management 1 1 2 
Elections Administration 3 1 2 
Election Records and Reporting 3 1 1 
Building Security 1 1 1 
Janitorial Services 1 1 1 
Cemetery Services 1 1 1 
Mosquito/Moth/Insect Control 1 1 1 
Fleet Purchasing 1 2 2 
Vehicle Maintenance 1 1 3 
Vehicle Garage/Storage 1 2 1 
Solid Waste Residential 1 1 1 
Solid Waste Non-Residential 1 1 1 
Recycling 1 2 1 
Landfill/Resource Recovery 1 3 1/2 
Building Permits 2 1 2 
Building Inspection 2 1 3 
Code Enforcement 2 1 3 
Well Permitting 2 1 3 
Septic Permitting 2 1 3 
911/Radio Communications 3 2/3 1/2 
Police Officer Training 1 1 3 
Police Street Patrol 3 2 2 
Police Bike Patrol 1 1 2 
Police Foot Patrol 1 1 2 
Police Horse Patrol 1 2 2 
Police Marine Patrol 1 3 2 
Police Helicopter Patrol 1 3 2 
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Detectives/Crime Investigations 1 1 3 
Police Canine Unit 1 2 2 
Emergency & Disaster Response 2 1 3 
Crime Laboratory 1 2/3 3 
Jail(s) 1 3 1 
Detention Center(s) 2 3 1 
Animal Licenses 1 1 2 
Animal Control 1 2 2 
Fire Inspection 1 1 3 
Fire Training 1 1 3 
Fire Hydrant Maintenance 1 1 1/2 
Fire Investigations 1 1 3 
Fire Fighting/Rescue 2 3 2 
Ambulance/EMS 2 3 3 
Hazmat Handling and Response 1 2/3 3 
Zoning Administration/Enforcement 2 1 2 
Engineering 1 1 3 
Surveying 1 1/2 3 
Community Planning/Development 1 1 2 
Business Retention/Expansion 1 1 2 
Business Licensing 1 1 2 
Restaurant/Food Regulation 1 1 3 
Public Convention Center 1 3 1 
Promotion/Tourism 1 2 1 
Attorney/Legal Services 3 1 3 
District Court 1 2 3 
Mediation or Dispute Resolution 1 1 3 
Road Construction/Improvement 1 3 1 
Road Maintenance 1 3 1 
Winter Road Maintenance 1 3 1 
Road Signs and Signals 1 2 1 
Street Lights 1 2 1 
Sidewalk Construction/Maintenance 1 2/3 1 
Roadside Mowing 1 2 1 
Sidewalk Beautification 1 2 1 
Water Treatment 1 3 2/3 
Water Distribution 1 3 1 
Sanitary Sewer Collection 1 3 1 
Sanitary Sewer Treatment 1 3 2/3 
Storm Water Management 2 2 2/3 
Storm Water Collection 2 3 1 
Storm Water Treatment 2 3 2/3 
Water Metering and Billing 1 2 1 
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Gas Metering and Billing 1 3 1 
Electric Metering and Billing 1 3 1 
Cable Service  1 3 1 
Parking Lots and Structures 1 3 1 
Parking Meters 1 1/2 1 
Internet Broadband 1 2/3 2 
Wireless Internet (Wi-Fi) 1 2/3 2 
Public Bus System 1 3 1 
Dial-a-Ride 1 2 1 
Airport 1 3 3 
Soil Quality and Conservation 1 2 3 
Water Quality and Conservation 1 2 3 
Watershed Management 1 2 3 
Air Quality Regulation 1 2 3 
Erosion Control Structures 1 2 3 
Environmental Education 1 1 2 
Hospitals/Clinics 1 3 3 
Parks 1 2/3 1 
Playgrounds 1 2 1 
Community/Recreation Center 1 3 1 
Senior Center 1 3 1 
Forestry Services 1 2 1 
Golf Course 1 3 1 
Community Pool 1 3 1 
Trails 1 2/3 1 
Beach Facilities 1 3 1 
Marina/Port Facilities 1 3 1 
Museum/Art Gallery 1 3 2 
Library 1 3 2 
Zoo 1 3 2/3 
Community Theater 1 3 1 
Stadium/Arena 1 3 1 
Entertainment Facilities 1 2/3 1 
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Appendix B: Percentage of Local Governments Reporting Each Provision Mode by 
Service or Function, CRC Survey, 2005 
Service Self Provide Horizontal Vertical 
Printing of Municipal Documents 73.90% 2.83% 8.48%
Records/Archives 86.27% 0.87% 6.09%
Document Destruction 77.14% 0.22% 1.96%
Training/Professional Development 51.65% 9.13% 19.13%
Payroll/Benefits 88.02% 0.65% 0.87%
Property Assessing 63.91% 11.74% 14.13%
Treasury Functions 94.09% 1.09% 9.13%
Tax Collection 95.87% 4.13% 12.83%
Accounting 93.90% 0.43% 0.43%
Purchasing 96.30% 1.74% 5.65%
Management Information Systems 41.19% 1.74% 10.00%
Geographic Information Systems 24.12% 6.09% 38.70%
Website Development/Management 41.48% 1.09% 6.74%
Elections Administration 85.00% 13.04% 29.78%
Election Records and Reporting 90.43% 8.26% 19.78%
Building Security 55.90% 1.09% 3.91%
Janitorial Services 66.74% 1.30% 0.22%
Cemetery Services 55.65% 5.65% 0.22%
Mosquito/Moth/Insect Control 19.74% 0.87% 22.61%
Fleet Purchasing 65.28% 2.61% 8.26%
Vehicle Maintenance 50.66% 2.17% 1.09%
Vehicle Garage/Storage 64.63% 2.17% 0.43%
Solid Waste Residential 13.91% 5.87% 2.83%
Solid Waste Non-Residential 7.00% 3.04% 2.39%
Recycling 16.45% 9.78% 13.26%
Landfill/Resource Recovery 5.73% 7.83% 10.65%
Building Permits 67.61% 7.39% 15.43%
Building Inspection 63.48% 9.57% 16.52%
Code Enforcement 74.57% 4.78% 14.78%
Well Permitting 9.15% 3.91% 63.91%
Septic Permitting 8.30% 3.91% 62.17%
911/Radio Communications 17.61% 17.83% 62.17%
Police Officer Training 34.00% 10.00% 46.52%
Police Street Patrol 40.26% 6.09% 39.35%
Police Bike Patrol 27.81% 3.04% 20.22%
Police Foot Patrol 23.56% 2.83% 18.04%
Police Horse Patrol 0.89% 1.96% 20.65%
Police Marine Patrol 1.78% 1.09% 31.30%
Police Helicopter Patrol 0.00% 1.30% 26.96%
Detectives/Crime Investigations 32.68% 5.43% 49.13%
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Police Canine Unit 14.32% 9.57% 51.30%
Emergency & Disaster Response 30.92% 17.17% 64.78%
Crime Laboratory 5.71% 3.26% 68.04%
Jail(s) 5.24% 3.04% 77.17%
Detention Center(s) 8.52% 3.26% 69.13%
Animal Licenses 38.65% 4.78% 64.57%
Animal Control 13.76% 4.13% 72.17%
Fire Inspection 48.58% 32.17% 14.13%
Fire Training 53.17% 41.96% 15.22%
Fire Hydrant Maintenance 50.22% 23.04% 6.74%
Fire Investigations 37.97% 31.74% 33.70%
Fire Fighting/Rescue 60.87% 47.39% 3.91%
Ambulance/EMS 31.81% 33.70% 18.48%
Hazmat Handling and Response 34.86% 38.04% 43.04%
Zoning Administration/Enforcement 88.48% 1.52% 7.17%
Engineering 17.98% 0.87% 8.04%
Surveying 9.91% 0.65% 10.22%
Community Planning/Development 68.48% 4.13% 16.96%
Business Retention/Expansion 35.38% 5.43% 17.83%
Business Licensing 30.84% 1.09% 31.09%
Restaurant/Food Regulation 3.30% 1.52% 61.52%
Public Convention Center 3.08% 2.83% 11.96%
Promotion/Tourism 11.62% 6.09% 18.04%
Attorney/Legal Services N/A 1.30% 7.39%
District Court 8.73% 7.17% 63.70%
Mediation or Dispute Resolution 6.59% 2.39% 34.78%
Road Construction/Improvement 24.89% 1.09% 65.43%
Road Maintenance 38.86% 1.52% 63.48%
Winter Road Maintenance 36.17% 1.30% 63.70%
Road Signs and Signals 31.37% 3.48% 70.87%
Street Lights 33.19% 5.00% 30.65%
Sidewalk Construction/Maintenance 34.86% 1.74% 23.70%
Roadside Mowing 38.56% 0.87% 46.74%
Sidewalk Beautification 42.11% 1.96% 18.48%
Water Treatment 22.76% 35.65% 8.26%
Water Distribution 37.80% 27.39% 7.39%
Sanitary Sewer Collection 39.39% 25.87% 9.78%
Sanitary Sewer Treatment 23.80% 34.35% 13.26%
Storm Water Management 38.02% 11.09% 23.91%
Storm Water Collection 36.92% 8.26% 20.87%
Storm Water Treatment 15.93% 9.13% 17.17%
Water Metering and Billing 43.76% 15.43% 7.17%
Gas Metering and Billing 1.31% 2.39% 1.09%
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Electric Metering and Billing 3.29% 3.04% 1.09%
Cable Service  1.97% 2.61% 0.65%
Parking Lots and Structures 26.42% 1.30% 1.09%
Parking Meters 5.25% 0.22% 0.65%
Internet Broadband 2.41% 0.87% 0.87%
Wireless Internet (Wi-Fi) 2.19% 1.30% 1.09%
Public Bus System 2.84% 14.57% 16.96%
Dial-a-Ride 8.79% 16.30% 22.39%
Airport 2.63% 5.00% 13.26%
Soil Quality and Conservation 8.32% 5.87% N/A
Water Quality and Conservation 12.25% 8.26% 57.39%
Watershed Management 15.10% 15.43% 53.48%
Air Quality Regulation 1.75% 3.48% 52.83%
Erosion Control Structures 9.91% 4.78% 55.00%
Environmental Education 14.51% 8.70% 45.22%
Hospitals/Clinics 2.18% 5.00% 10.65%
Parks 66.16% 10.43% 16.96%
Playgrounds 61.84% 12.17% 9.35%
Community/Recreation Center 29.61% 9.78% 8.26%
Senior Center 25.49% 13.91% 14.13%
Forestry Services 17.14% 1.74% 15.22%
Golf Course 5.70% 3.70% 4.57%
Community Pool 10.57% 8.91% 5.00%
Trails 34.21% 7.17% 19.35%
Beach Facilities 9.87% 3.91% 9.78%
Marina/Port Facilities 5.51% 2.39% 4.13%
Museum/Art Gallery 8.53% 6.74% 5.65%
Library 23.63% 39.78% 19.35%
Zoo 0.66% 1.74% 2.83%
Community Theater 4.38% 6.09% 2.83%
Stadium/Arena 3.28% 5.65% 4.78%
Entertainment Facilities 4.16% 3.26% 3.26%
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